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MACHINES KEEP CALLING ME?-THE
TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT OF 1991 AFTER MOSER V. FCC
Scenario: Ring. Ring. You get up from the family dinner table and
pick up the phone—a prerecorded voice comes on: "Hello. You were
selected at random to receive a 30% discount on a luxury cruise
to the Bahamas. . . ." Click. You hang up the phone in disgust
and return to your meal, muttering under your breath.
Besides slamming down the phone and swearing, believe it or not,
you can sue.' The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 ("TCPA"
or "the Act") makes unlawful the initiation of any telephone call to any
residential telephone line by an artificial or prerecorded voice ("auto-
matic dialing-announcing devices" or "ADADs") without the prior ex-
press consent of the called party, unless the call is for emergency
purposes or is exempted under another part of the Act.' Receipt of
one of these annoying phone calls now entitles you to bring a private
action, in which you can recover a minimum of $500.3
Fortunately for businesses that employ such devices, as with most
of the offers in these prerecorded messages, there is a catch. 4 A careful
analysis of the permissible scope of commercial speech regulation
reveals that the Act may violate the First Amendment rights of compa-
nies or individuals who use this modern technology to reach millions
of consumers each day.5 The Act makes a content-based distinction
predicated on whether ADAD messages are commercial or noncom-
I See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (3) (Supp. 1992).
2 See id. § 227(b)(1)(B).
3 Id. § 227(h) (3).
4 See infra notes 157-81, 235-343 and accompanying text for a discussion of the constitu-
tionality of 42 U.S.C. § 227(b) (1) (B), which bans the use of ADADs to contact residences.
5 See Moser v. FCC, 826 F. Supp. 360, 367 (D. Or. 1993), appeal docketed, No. 93-35686 (9th
Cir. 1994).
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mercial, prohibiting only the former. 6
 In addition, no "reasonable fit"
appears to exist between the means of restriction in the regulation and
the ends the Act seeks to achieve.? The Act seeks to protect residential
privacy from the invasions of telemarketing, but does so by completely
banning only one small aspect of the telemarketing industry. 8 In 1993, in
Moser v. FCC, the United States District Court for the District of Ore-
gon, applying such reasoning, held the Telephone Consumer Protec-
tion Act unconstitutional. 9
 This decision is currently being appealed. 1 °
This Note contends that certain provisions of the Act violate the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution, based on Con-
gress's intent, recent cases and the existence of alternatives to those
provisions of the Act.l 1
 Section I discusses the general constitutional
considerations raised by commercial speech." Section II describes the
legislative background and pertinent components of the TCPA.' 3 Sec-
tion III presents the facts and reasoning underlying the decision of the
District Court of Oregon in Moser, as well as other pertinent cases
regarding state ADAD statutes." Finally, Section IV analyzes the consti-
tutionality of certain provisions of the Act and suggests possible alter-
native solutions to the problems Congress sought to alleviate through
the Act." Section V concludes that the Telephone Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 1991 is, in part, unconstitutional.
I. COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. The Origins of Commercial Speech Protection
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution prevents
Congress and state legislative bodies from proscribing speech." Regu-
lations based on the content of speech are presumptively invalid."
6 See id. at 363.
7 See id. at 365.
8 See id. at 366-67.
9 See id. at 367.
1 ° Moser, 826 E Supp. 360 (D. Or. 1993), appeal docketed, No. 93-35686 (9th Cir. 1994).
11 See infra notes 235-343 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 16-84 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 85-151 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 152-234 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 235-343 and accompanying text.
18 See U.S. CONST. amend. 1, providing in pertinent part, "Congress shall make no law	 .
abridging the freedom of speech ...."
17 See Mark S. Nadel, Rings of Privacy: Unsolicited Telephone Calls and the Right of Privacy, 4
YALE J. on REG. 99, 103 (1986); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992);
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 508 (1991).
With respect to noncommercial speech, content-based restrictions are allowed only in extraordi-
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Reasonable regulations of the time, place or manner of speech, how-
ever, may be permissible, if justified without reference to the content
of the regulated speech."
Case law has defined commercial speech as speech that does no
more than propose a commercial transaction. 19 State or federal gov-
ernments may regulate the content of commercial speech when it fails
to accurately inform the public about lawful activity or relates to illegal
activity.20 No consensus emerges from the contentious debate over how
to treat commercial speech.2' Some commentators would grant com-
mercial speech the same First Amendment protection as any other type
of speech, while others would offer commercial speech only limited
protection. 22
nary circumstances. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (libel); Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571-72 (1942) (fighting words).
18 See, e.g., Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct, 1505, 1516 (1993); Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); see also Nadel, supra note 17, at 103; Susan Burnett
Lutes, Give Me a Home Where No Salesmen Phone: Telephone Solicitation and the First Amendment,
7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 129, 133 (1979).
19 See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976); Pittsburgh Press
CO. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973). This definition is
neither precise nor consistently applied, SeeJOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 16.26, at 1011 (4th ed. 1991). This definition has also been debated by commen-
tators. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech, 76 VA. L, REV. 627,
639-48 (1990). This Note assumes that telemarketing by private profit-seeking companies adver-
tising goods or services is commercial speech.
Prior to 1942, the United States Supreme Court had never heard a commercial speech case
regarding the First Amendment of the Constitution. See W. John Moore, 1st Amendment's Stepchild
Is Getting More Attention, NAT'L", Aug. 21, 1993, at 2074. In that year, in Valentine v. Chrestensen,
the Court held that the Constitution does not restrain the government with respect to purely
commercial advertising. See 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). The city of New York passed an ordinance
forbidding distribution in the streets of commercial and business advertising matter. Id. at 53 &
n.1, Chrestensen owned a former United States Navy submarine and distributed handbills adver-
tising that visitors could see the submarine for a fee. Id. at 52-53. The Court, with no reasoning
or citations, concluded that the Constitution imposed no restraint on government concerning
purely commercial advertising. See id. at 54. The Court therefore reversed an injunction that had
enjoined the city police from interfering with Chrestensen's distribution. See id. at 54-55.
"Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980); see also
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 19, at 1011; Kozinski Banner, supra note 19, at 651-52.
Although in favor of extending full protection to commercial speech, Kozinski and Banner agree
that there must be some protection from consumer fraud. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 19,
at 651.
21 Compare Kozinski & Banner, supra note 19, at 628, 634-38 (commercial speech should be
treated the same as other types of speech because commercial speech is not clearly more objective
or durable) with Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 411, 469-75 (1992) (commercial speech may be treated differently because it is
verifiable and durable, and because regulation can be more socially beneficial than detrimental),
22 Compare Kozinski & Banner, supra note 19, at 628 (arguing that the distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech "makes no sense") with Eberle, supra note 21, at 471
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In 1976, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., the United States Supreme Court held that
purely commercial speech fell within the scope of First Amendment
protection.23 Consumers of prescription drugs challenged the validity
of a Virginia statute that barred prescription drug advertisements. 24
The Court defined commercial speech as speech that did no more
than propose a commercial transaction. 25 According to the Court, a
purely economic interest, such as a proposed commercial advertise-
ment or transaction, did not disqualify an individual's speech from
First Amendment protection. 26 The Court observed that a consumer's
interest in the free flow of commercial information may equal, if not
exceed, his or her interest in more traditionally protected speech such
as political debate. 27 In this regard, the Court determined that the free
flow of commercial information is indispensable to the public interest in
intelligent and well-informed economic decisions. 96 The Court weighed
this public interest against Virginia's interest in maintaining a high
degree of professionalism among licensed pharmacists. 29 The Court
concluded that the advertising ban did not directly affect professional
standards and that the public had a substantial need to be well-in-
formed when choosing pharmacists. 3° Therefore, the Court struck down
the statute under the First Amendment."
In 1978, in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, the United States
Supreme Court upheld a restriction on commercial speech, limiting
Virginia Pharmacy by distinguishing commercial speech from other
varieties of more traditionally protected speech." The Ohio State Bar
(arguing that because commercial speech is a "second-order" category of speech, a greater degree
of regulation may be tolerable as compared to "core" speech). See generally Ronald K.L. Collins
& David M. Skover, Commerce Ca' Communication, 71 Tex. L. REv. 697 (1993) (debating merits of
treating commercial speech differently from other types of speech).
23
 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1975).
24 Id. at 749-50, 753.
25 Id. at 762 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973)).
28 Id. at 762.
27 See id. at 763; see also Kozinski & Banner, supra note 19, at 652. The Virginia Pharmacy
Court described commercial information as who was producing and selling what product, for
what reason and at what price. 425 U.S. at 765. The Court also remarked, "Even an individual
advertisement, though entirely 'commercial,' may be of general public interest? Id. at 764.
28 Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765.
29 See id. at 766.
38 Id. at 769-70.
31 See id. at 770. The Court explicitly left open the possibility of permissible restrictions on
commercial speech that were not presented in this case, such as those based on time, place or
manner, as well as restrictions on false or misleading speech. Id. at 770-71.
32 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56, 467 (1978). The Court, however,
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Association sought to discipline an attorney who personally contacted
accident victims in order to represent them on a contingent-fee basis."
According to the Court, the subordinate position of commercial speech
in the scale of First Amendment values afforded it a limited measure
of protection. 54 The Court stated that, unlike a public advertisement,
which merely presents information and leaves the reader or listener
free to act upon it or not, in-person solicitation may exert pressure
and, consequently, demand an immediate response without providing
an opportunity for comparison or reflection." The Court concluded
that the furtherance of the important state interest in preventing
intimidation and undue influence justified discipline of the attorney
by the Bar Association."
B. The Central Hudson Test for Restriction of Commercial Speech
In 1980, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Culp. v. Public Service
Commission, the United States Supreme Court established a four-part
test to determine whether or not the restrictions on commercial speech
in a particular case were constitutional. 37 An electric utility challenged
the constitutionality of a regulation that banned promotional advertis-
ing by the utility." In approaching the constitutional issue, the Court
first noted that the Constitution afforded a lesser protection to com-
mercial speech than to other types of speech and that the degree of
protection depended on the nature of both the expression itself and
the governmental interests served by the regulations." The Court ar-
ticulated a four-part test to analyze commercial speech cases: 4° (1) the
Court will determine whether the speech misleads or relates to an
unlawful activity and therefore does not merit First Amendment pro-
distinguished the in-person solicitations in Ohralik from other forms of "truthful, 'restrained'
advertising" about the availability and terms of routine legal services. Compare Ohralik, 436 U.S.
at 454-55 (disciplinary rule barring in-person solicitation permissible) with Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (disciplinary rule barring advertisement of availability and
price of routine legal services struck down under First Amendment).
" Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449-53; see also Brian J. King, Note, Ambulance-Chasing Accountants?:
In-Person Solicitation and the Professions, 34 B.C. L. REV. 561 (1993) for a discussion of the
constitutionality of in-person solicitation by attorneys and other professionals.
34 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456.
36 Id. at 457. One can argue that telephone solicitations are analogous to in-person solicita-
tions and create the same kind of pressures.
36 Id. at 459, 462.
57 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
38 1d. at 558-59.
39 /d. at 563.
40 M. at 566.
90	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol, 36:85
tection;41
 (2) the restriction must serve a substantial governmental
interest;42
 (3) the restriction must directly advance that substantial
interest;45
 and (4) the restriction cannot be more extensive than nec-
essary to serve that governmental interest.44 Given the facts of Central
Hudson, the Court concluded that the regulation of advertising by
utility companies was more extensive than necessary to further the
state's interest in energy conservation.45
In 1981, in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, the United States
Supreme Court upheld a ban on outdoor, offsite advertising billboards.46
San Diego enacted an ordinance that prohibited offsite commercial
billboards, but permitted onsite advertising signs identifying the owner
of the premises and the goods sold or manufactured on the site. 47
 Sev-
eral companies engaged in the outdoor advertising business brought
suit to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance. 48
 The Court applied the
Central Hudson test, discussing in detail only the third part of the test,
advancement of government interests. 49
The Court asserted that the restriction must directly advance the
government's interests in aesthetics and traffic safety. 5° According to
the Court, the city may have believed that offsite advertising, with its
periodically changing content, presented a more serious problem than
onsite advertising. 51
 In addition, the Court stated that the city could
have reasonably concluded that the interests in identifying a business's
location, or its products or services, were stronger on the part of a
commercial enterprise and the public than their interests in an enter-
prise's ability to lease its advertising space to commercial companies
located elsewhere' The Court concluded that the ordinance directly
advanced the government interests and, thus, upheld the ordinance's
constitutionality.53
41 Id., 447 U.S. at 566. In light of the greater potential for deception or confusion in adver-
tising, as opposed to noncommercial speech, some content-based restrictions on commercial
speech may be permissible. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983); In
re R.MJ., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
42 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
46 Id.
44 Id.
46 Id. at 570-71.
46 453 U.S. 490, 493, 512 (1981).
47 1d. at 494 n.l.
48 Id. at 496-97.
49 1d. at 507-08. The Court stated that, in this case, "Where can be little controversy over
the application of the first, second, and fourth criteria." Id. at 507.
69 Id. at 508.
61 Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 511.
52 /d. at 512.
53 Id. The Court held the ordinance to be unconstitutional on other grounds, namely that
it banned signs carrying noncommercial advertising. Id. at 512, 521.
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Similarly, in 1986, in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism
Co. of Puerto Rico, the United States Supreme Court held Puerto Rico's
ban on casino advertising constitutional." A casino prohibited from
advertising its gambling facilities inside Puerto Rico sought a declaratory
judgment that the advertising restriction impermissibly suppressed
commercial speech, in violation of the First Amendment. 55 The Court
rejected the casino's argument under the third part of the Central
Hudson test, concluding that the exemption of other kinds of gambling
such as horse racing, cockfighting and the lottery from the advertising
restriction did not render it underinclusive. 56 The Court observed that
the restriction directly advanced the legislature's interest in reducing
demand for games of chance, regardless of whether or not other forms
of gambling were regulated. 17 In addition, the Court stated that be-
cause the exempted forms of gambling were traditionally parts of the
Puerto Rican culture, they did not present risks as great as those
associated with casino gambling." The Court also stated that the re-
strictions were no more extensive than necessary, because they only
applied to advertising directed at Puerto Rican residents and not tour-
ists." Finally, the Court asserted that the greater power of the Puerto
Rico legislature to ban casino gambling altogether necessarily included
the "lesser" power to ban the advertising of casino gambling." Thus,
the Court held that because the restriction passed the Central Hudson
test, it did not violate the First Amendment. 61
In 1989, in Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v.
Fox, the United States Supreme Court modified the final part of the
Central Hudson test, holding that a restriction on commercial speech
may be more extensive than necessary, as long as a reasonable fit exists
between the ends promoted by the regulation and the means chosen
by the regulation for that promotion. 62 University students challenged
54 478 U.S. 328,330,344 (1986).
55 Id. at 330-31.
56 Id. at 342-43. The Court first noted that the commercial speech was not misleading and
did not concern unlawful activity. Id. at 340-41. Second, according to the Court, Puerto Rico's
interest in reducing the demand for casino gambling in order to protect the health, safety and
welfare of Puerto Rican residents was substantial. Id. at 341.
57 Id. at 342.
58 See id. at 342-43.
59 Posadas, 478 U.S. at 343.
6G Id. at 345-46.
61 Id. at 344.
62 Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,480 (1989); see also Posadas,
478 U.S. at 341 (analysis of state's commercial speech regulation under last two steps of Central
Hudson test involves consideration of "fit" between legislature's ends and means chosen to
accomplish those ends); In re R.Mj., 455 U.S. 191,203 (1982) (state's interference with speech
must be proportional to substantial interest served).
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a university resolution that prohibited the carrying out of product
demonstrations similar to 'Tupperware parties." 65 According to the
Court, restrictions by the government, here the state university, on free
speech need not employ the least restrictive means, provided they are
narrowly tailored to achieve the desired goals of the regulations. 64 The
Court declared that the lower courts had not properly applied the new
reasonable fit test and had not considered the impact of the resolution
on noncommercial speech. 65
In 1993, in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., the United
States Supreme Court applied the Central Hudson-Fox test, and failed
to find a reasonable fit.66 Cincinnati passed an ordinance that banned
the distribution of commercial handbills on public property.° When
the city construed this ordinance to include a ban of newsracks belong-
ing to commercial handbill distributors, but not newsracks belonging
to newspapers, commercial publishers challenged the ordinance's con-
stitutionality. 68 The Court determined that the city failed to establish a
reasonable fit between the restrictions placed on commercial speech
through the ban on commercial newsracks and the goals of safety and
aesthetics that the city sought to serve through the ban. 69 The Court
reasoned that the city's distinction between types of speech had no
bearing on its asserted interests, and further noted the existence of
reasonable, less restrictive alternatives to the ban, which the city could
have implemented in order to achieve its goals." The Court reiterated
that a regulation of commercial speech need not be the least restrictive
means to achieve legitimate ends, but added that the presence of
"numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives" to the restric-
tion was "relevant" to the determination of whether a reasonable fit
existed. 71
65 Fox, 492 U.S. at 471-72.
64 Id. at 478, 480; Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797 (1989). In previous cases,
the Court had indicated in dicta that the final stage of the Central Hudson test required protection
of the state interest only by the least restrictive means possible. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S. 626, 644 (1985); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
65 See Fox, 492 U.S. at 485-86.
66 Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1510 (1993).
67 M. at 1508 nn.2-3.
sa /d. at 1508.
69 /d. at 1510.
7° Id. at 1510, 1514.
71 Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1510 n.13. According to the Court, the city failed to address
its concern about the newsracks by regulating their size, shape, appearance or number, indicating
that the city did not carefully calculate the costs and benefits of its prohibition. Id. at 1510; see
also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 805 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing
that narrow tailoring of regulation to its ends mandates both examination of alternative methods
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The Court observed that, because commercial and noncommer-
cial publications shared equal responsibility for the safety and aes-
thetic problems that motivated the city, distinguishing between them
based on content bore no relationship whatsoever to the legitimate
interests asserted by the city." Unlike Metromedia, which involved dis-
parate treatment of two types of commercial speech, this case involved
discrimination between commercial and noncommercial speech." The
Court held that the city's assertion of the relatively low First Amend-
ment value of commercial speech did not by itself justify a "selective
and categorical ban" on newsracks containing commercial handbills. 74
The Court concluded that, because the city's interests were unrelated
to the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech,
and because this distinction was based on content, the city's ban did
not comply with the First Amendment."
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the
city's prohibition of commercial newsracks related directly to its goals,
because every newsrack removed from public sidewalks marginally
enhanced the safety and the aesthetics of the city." According to Chief
Justice Rehnquist, governments may stop short of fully accomplishing
their goals without violating the First Amendment." Justice Rehnquist
of serving asserted governmental interest and determination whether greater efficacy of chal-
lenged regulation outweighs increased burden it places on protected speech). The prohibition
would have resulted in the removal of only 62 newsracks out of approximately 1500 to 2000 on
public property. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1510; see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 463
U.S. 60, 73 (1983) (regulation providing only for the most limited marginal support for the
interest asserted held invalid).
72 Discovery Network, 115 S. Ct. at 1514. Both types of newsracks are ''equally unattractive"
regardless of what type of publication is inside. Id.
73 See id. at 1514 n.20.
74 Id. at 1516. Justice Blackmun would have held truthful, noncoercive commercial speech
concerning lawful activities entitled to full First Amendment protection. See id. at 1520 (Black.
mun, J., concurring). In a case similar to Discovery Network in New York, the Supreme Court of
New York, Appellate Division, First Department, held that a regulation prohibiting the installation
of sidewalk structures for the purpose of distributing commercial speech was unconstitutional.
See City of New York v, Learning Annex, 589 N.Y.S.2d 28, 28 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992), appeal dismissed,
613 N.E.2d 972, dismissal vacated, 613 N.E.2d 961 (N.Y. 1993),
75 See Discovery Network, 113 S. CL at 1517.
7s Id. at 1523 (Rehnquist, Cj., dissenting).
77 Id. (Rehnquist, Cj., dissenting); see also Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of
Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 343 (1986) (ban On promotional advertising of casino gambling aimed
at Puerto Rico residents upheld, even though advertising of other forms of gambling were
permitted); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 512 (1981) (ban of offiite
billboards containing commercial speech upheld, even though onsite billboards identifying owner
of premises and goods produced thereon were permitted). Although the Discovery Network dissent
cites Posadas, it is important to note that the Posadas Court specifically stated that the legislature
believed that the risks associated with casino gambling were greater than those associated with
94	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 36:85
therefore concluded that burdening less speech than necessary to
achieve the prohibition's desired goals sufficiently created a reasonable
fit between the prohibition and the city's interests. 78
In summary, an analysis of a restriction on commercial speech
focuses on whether the restriction is impermissibly content-based and
whether the restriction represents a constitutional limitation on com-
mercial speech under the Central Hudson-Fox test. 79 In both areas, a
restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve the government's goal
in enacting the restriction.80 To pass constitutional muster under the
four-part Central Hudson test, commercial speech must not mislead or
relate to unlawful activity, the state must have a substantial interest, the
restriction must advance that interest and the restriction must be no
more extensive than necessary to fulfill that interest. 8 ' The Court has
modified the last element of the test to permit restrictions more ex-
tensive than necessary, provided a reasonable fit exists between the
interests promoted by the restriction and the means chosen in the
restriction to promote the interests. 82 The existence of numerous alter-
natives to a restriction on commercial speech is relevant to the deter-
mination of a reasonable fit." Finally, the low value of commercial
speech will not, by itself, justify a distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech. 84
other types of gambling in Puerto Rico. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 342-43. In Discovery Network, by
contrast, there is no indication that the legislature considered the newsracks containing commer-
cial materials to pose a greater threat to safety or aesthetics than those containing newspapers.
See 113 S. Ct. at 1514.
78 Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1525 (Rehnquist, GI, dissenting).
79 See, e.g., Barbara M. Mack, Commercial Speech: A Historical Overview of Its First Amendment
Protections and an Analysis of Its Future Constitutional Safeguards, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 59, 65 (1989);
James E. Meadows, The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Consumer Salvation or Uncon-
stitutional Restraint?, 9 COMPUTER LAW. 13, 16 (1992); see also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
fl° See Appellees' Brief at 10, Moser v. FCC, No. 93-35686 (9th Cir. filed Jan. 20, 1994); Mack,
supra note 79, at 65; Nadel, supra note 17, at 127; see also Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of
N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (a restriction on commercial speech must be "narrowly
tailored to achieve the desired objective"); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)
(a time, place and manlier restriction must be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant govern-
mental interest").
81 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
82 See Fox, 492 U.S. at 478, 480.
83 See Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1510 n.13.
See id. at 1516.
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IL THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991
A. Background to the TCPA
Telemarketing—soliciting by businesses, individuals and organiza-
tions over telephone lines—began in the 1920s when stockbrokers
used their telephones to give investors frequent information updates."
In the 1930s and '40s, when much of the male-dominated workforce
was drafted into the military, businesses developed telephone sales
operations as an alternative to door-to-door sales." Magazine and news-
paper publishers in the 1950s began to use telemarketing to increase
their subscription rates." Later in the '50s and beyond, new innova-
tions, from the Yellow Pages and 800 numbers, to ADADs in the early
1980s, were developed to augment the level of business conducted by
telephone." In 1980, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")
determined that it should refrain from regulating unsolicited calls and
ADAD equipment." At that time, ADADs were not widely used inter-
state, and the FCC observed that an outright ban of ADADs would
appear to violate the Constitution."
According to Representative Edward J. Markey of Massachusetts,
one of the Act's framers, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991 represented an attempt by Congress to balance an individual's
right to privacy in his or her home with technological advances in
telemarketing. 9 ' According to the Act's other primary framers, Sena-
tors Larry Pressler of South Dakota and Ernest Hollings of South
Carolina, the Act represented Congress's response to numerous com-
plaints from constituents about disruptive, annoying and dangerous
telephone calls by ADADs." These calls consumed tape and time on
answering machines, did not disconnect when the called party hung
up, and increased the quantity of intrusions into the home." In addi-
85 See Connie Lauerman, Hype Tech: Now It's Death and Taxes . and Unsolicited Commercial
Phone Calls,' Cm. num, Nov. 24, 1991, Sunday Magazine, at 20.
86 See id.
87 See id.
88 See id.; Edmund L. Andrews, Curbing the Telephone Robots, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1991, at DI.
89 Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1024 (1980).
90 See id. at 1024.
91 See 137 GONG, REC. E793 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1991) (statement of Rep. Markey).
92 See, e.g., id.; 137 CONG. REC. 518,317 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Sen. Pressler);
137 CONG. REC. 59,874 (daily ed. July 11, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
98 See S. REP. No. 178, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1969;
137 CONG. REC. E793 (daily ed. March 6, 1991) (statement of Rep. Markey).
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tion, they created a potential danger of occupying a phone line that
an individual may need in an emergency." ADADs could tie up hospital
switchboards, and activate pagers, cellular phones and other devices
by which the receiver is charged for calls." Many states began to
regulate ADADs as a result of such problems, but interstate companies
could evade such regulations." Congress responded by enacting the
TCPA 97
The TCPA regulates automated telephone equipment, fax ma-
chines and live telemarketing." The Act outlaws the use of ADADs to
call emergency telephone lines, hospital rooms, pagers, residential
telephone lines (without prior consent of the recipient) or multiple
telephone lines of the same business." The Act also outlaws the send-
ing of unsolicited fax advertisements.'" In directing the FCC to use its
regulatory power to prescribe regulations to implement its require-
ments, the Act permits the FCC to exempt from these bans certain
types of calls, including those not made for commercial purposes. 101
Moreover, the Act establishes technical and procedural standards for
permitted faxes and ADAD messages.'° 2 The Act also directs the FCC
to consider compiling a national database of residential subscribers
who object to receiving telephone solicitations.'" The TCPA creates
private rights of action as recourse for violations of the ADAD and fax
bans and for repeated calls over objections.'"
B. The Legislative History of the TCPA
The Act is actually a compilation of several separate bills, primarily
one from the United States House of Representatives and two from the
United States Senate.'" The invasion of privacy of the home by unso-
See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. 516,205 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
w See H.R. REP. No. 317, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1991); S. REP. No. 177, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1991).
56 See S. 1462, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(7) (1991), as reported in 137 CONG. REC. H11,307
(daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991); H.R. REP. No. 317, 102d Cong.. 1st Sess. 2 (1991).
97
 See generally 47 U.S.C. § 227.
98 Id.
99 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (1)(A), (B), (D).
1 °° Id. § 227(b) (1)(C).
1 ° 1 Id. § 227(b) (2).
1521d. § 227(d).
103 1d. § 227 (c) (3 ).
IN 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (3), (c) (5).
105 See Meadows, supra note 79, at 13. Senate Bill 1442, the Telephone Advertising Consumer
Rights Act, and H.R. 1589, the Telephone Privacy Act, which contributed to the final Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), are not discussed in detail here. See Meadows, supra note 79,
at 13, for a discussion of these Acts. The Telephone Privacy Act first introduced the idea of
banning all ADADs. 137 Conrc.. REe. H1,918 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1991) (statement of Rep. Unsoeld).
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licited telephone advertising motivated the creation of each of these
bills. 106 The telephone demands immediate attention—when it rings,
people instinctively answer it. 107 The problem, according to Repre-
sentative Markey, chief sponsor of the House bill, is that when people
get home from work, they deserve some peace and quiet. 108
In the House, Representative , Markey introduced H.R. 1304, the
Telephone Advertising Consumer Rights Act, on March 6, 1991. 109 His
purpose was to free individuals and businesses from the intrusive, costly
and dangerous consequences of unsolicited telephone advertising."°
According to Markey, ADADs not only called residences, but reached
hospitals, fire stations, pagers and unlisted numbers, making them
dangerous as well as annoying.'" Representative Markey also sought to
address problems caused by unsolicited or "junk" faxes, such as tying
up fax lines and driving up the recipient's paper costs.'" In the Senate,
Senator Pressler introduced S. 1410, the Telephone Advertising Con-
sumer Rights Act, embracing many of the same ideas as Representative
Markey's bill.'"
Both bills sought to eliminate unsolicited calls to emergency and
public safety telephone numbers and to paging and cellular equip-
ment.'" Both H.R. 1304 and S. 1410 proposed the establishment of
technical and procedural regulations to be followed by individuals or
businesses engaging in live or recorded telephone or fax solicitation.'"
For example, the message would have had to state clearly the identity
of the solicitor at the beginning of the message, and later provide a
phone number or address at which the solicitor could be contacted.'"
Senator Pressler's bill would have made unlawful the sending of any
unsolicited advertisement by fax.'" Representative Markey's and . Sena-
1°6 See 137 CoNG. REC, 516,208 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Sen. Bentsen); 137
CONG. REC. 59,874 (daily ed. July 11, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings); 137 CoNG. REC. E793
(daily ed. Mar. 6, 1991) (statement of Rep. Markey).
1 " 137 Coign. REc. 518,317 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Sen. Pressler); 137 CONG.
REC. E793 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1991) (statement of Rep. Markey).
108 Cindy Skrzycki, House Votes to Restrict Calls By Telemarketers, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1991,
at B1 (quoting Rep. Edward J. Markey).




11S See 137 CONG. REG. 58,991 (daily ed. July 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. Pressler).
114 See 5. 1410, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b) (4) (1991); 137 CONG. RE.c. E793 (daily ed. Mar.
6, 1991) (statement of Rep. Markey).
115 See H.R. 1304, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(d) (1991), as reported in H.R. REP. No. 317, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1991); S. 1410, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(6)(2), (d) (1991).
II6 H.R. 1304, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(d) (2)(A), as reported in H.R. REP. No. 317, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess, 5 (1991).
17 See S. 1410, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b) (3), (e) (1991).
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for Pressler's bills would have directed the FCC to protect privacy rights
by evaluating possible alternative technologies, including an electronic
database through which objecting individuals and business subscribers
could free themselves from unwanted telephone solicitafions. 118
 If a
consumer put his or her name on the national "do-not-call" database,
advertisers would be required to honor this choice by not calling. 19
On July 11, 1991, shortly after Senator Pressler introduced his bill,
Senator Hollings introduced S. 1462, the Automated Telephone Con-
sumer Protection Act.'" Senate Bill 1462 called for banning the use of
ADADs to call homes and also prohibited all junk faxes.'" Refer-
ring to computerized calls as "the scourge of modern civilization,"
Senator Hollings echoed many of the complaints of Representative
Markey.' 22 As introduced, S. 1462 banned all calls by ADADs, regardless
of whether commercial, charitable or political.'" Simply put, this leg-
islation required that when a person was phoned at home, a live
operator had to be on the other end of the line.'"
Senator Hollings shared Representative Markey's concern about
safety risks resulting from computerized callers that did not hang up
and thus tied up the lines.' 25 As a result, Senator Hollings' bill required
that ADADs hang up within five seconds of the discontinuation of the
call by the recipient. 126 Later changes to S. 1462 created a private right
1114 See id. § 3(c) (3) (1991); 137 CONG. REC. E793 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Markey).
119 See H.R. 1304, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(c) (3) (F) (1991), as reported in H.R. REp. No. 317,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1991).
120 137 CONG. REC. S9,874 (daily ed. July 11, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
1211d ,
122 Id. Senator Hollings termed such calls "assault[s]" and "telephone terrorism," and his
comments decrying their ruinous effect on consumers' lives were even stronger than Repre-
sentative Markey's. Id.; 137 CONG. REC. S16,205 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Hollings).
120 137 CONG. REC. 516,206 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings); 137 CONG.
REC. 59,874 (daily ed. July 11, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
124 137 CONG. REC. 516,206 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings). Based on
the assumption that people do not have the same expectation of privacy at work as they do in
the home, Senator Hollings' bill banned only automated calls to residences. 137 CONG. REC.
S9,874 (daily ed. July 11, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
125
 137 CONG. REC.. 59,874 (daily ed. July 11, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings). For example,
Senator Hollings described one case in which a family was unable to call 911 in response to an
emergency because a computerized message was transmitting on the phone line and would not
hang up. 137 CONG. Rec. 516,205 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings). In another
example, an elderly woman confined to bed in a hospital after surgery was constantly interrupted
by computerized telephone solicitations. Id. Senator Hollings listed further complaints from
business people with multiple telephone lines and ambulance dispatchers that had their switch-
boards tied up by ADADs. Id.
126 137 CONG. Ric. 59,874 (daily ed. July 11, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
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of action so consumers who received computerized calls had some
recourse.' 27 Finally, Senator Hollings' bill recognized the authority of
the FCC to promulgate further rules, such as additional exemptions
from the ADAD prohibitions. 128
In November of 1991, the House and Senate agreed upon the
provisions of S. 1462 and passed it. 129 The first section of the bill
contained a series of congressional findings.'" Congress estimated that
more than 300,000 solicitors called more than 18 million Americans
every day, an increase from Representative Markey's original figures."'
Congress also found that residential telephone subscribers considered
automated telephone calls, regardless of the content or the initiator of
the message, to be a nuisance and an invasion of privacy.L 3" In the final
version of the bill, Congress attempted to protect small businesses by
directing the FCC to examine whether the provisions of the Act should
apply to such businesses.'" In addition, the bill then contained an
exemption from the ban of ADAD calls to residences for businesses
that had an established business relationship with their customers.' 34
Notably, the bill then permitted the FCC to exempt calls not made for
a commercial purpose from the general ban of prerecorded solicita-
tions to residences.'" Representative Markey claimed that such an
exception was "common sense," and that consumers do not mind
certain classes and categories of calls, presumably charitable, political,
research and other noncommercial calls. 136 Senator Hollings stated
that noncommercial automated calls may not be as invasive of privacy
as those made for commercial purposes. 137 On December 20, 1991,
127 137 CONG. REC. 516,205 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
128 137 CONG. Rec. 316,206 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings). For
example, Senator Hollings stated that this provision responded to concerns expressed by compa-
nies that used machines to place calls for debt-collection purposes. Id.
129 See 137 Cow:. REC. S18,781, 318,784 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991); 137 CONG. REC. 1111,307
(daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991).
130 See S. 1462, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1991), as reported in 137 CONC.. REC. H11,307-08
(daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991).
181 Compare S. 1462, 102c1 Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(3) (1991), as reported in 137 CONG. Ric.
H11,307 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (300,000 solicitors making 18 million calls) with 137 CONG.
REC. E793 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1991) (statement of Rep. Markey) (180,(100 solicitors making
7,000,000 calls).
182 See S. 1462, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(10) (1991), as reported in 137 CONG. Rm. 1111,307
(daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991).
183
 137 CONG. REC. 518,317 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Sen. Pressler).
139 Id,
235 5. 1462, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(3) (2) (B) (i) (1991), as reported in 137 CONG. Rzc.
H11,308 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991).
158 137 CONG. REC. 1111,312 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Markey).
187 137 CONG. REC. 518,784 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings). Senator
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President Bush signed the TCPA into law, praising the purpose of
protecting residential privacy, but cautioning that the Act might curtail
legitimate business activity.'"
C. The TCPA as Enacted
The Act as enacted became an amendment to Tide II of the
Communications Act of 1934, and encompassed many different provi-
sions with regard to unsolicited telephone calls.'" In § 227(a), the Act
defined relevant terms such as automatic telephone dialing system,
telephone facsimile machine and unsolicited advertisement.' 44 The Act
then created some blanket restrictions on the use of automated tele-
phone equipment.'" Under § 227(b) (1) (A), calls, other than for emer-
gency use, using any automated telephone dialing system or prere-
corded voice were unlawful if made to any emergency line, any health
care facility room, or any pager or cellular phone for which the called
party is charged.' 42
 Furthermore, § 227(b) (1) (B) outlawed the initia-
tion of any telephone call to any residential telephone line using an
artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the prior
express consent of the recipient. 143
 Section 227(b) (I) (C) places a simi-
lar ban on unsolicited faxes.' 44
Under § 227(b) (2), the Act directed the FCC to consider further
regulations and exemptions, including prohibiting ADAD calls to busi-
nesses and exempting noncommercial calls and certain commercial
calls that do not affect privacy rights or contain unsolicited advertise-
ments. 143
 If a party violated any of the prohibitions, the Act provided
Hollings stated that "[t]he phrase 'calls that are not made for a commercial purpose' is intended
in the constitutional sense and is intended to be consistent with the court decisions which
recognize that noncommercial speech can receive less protection than commercial speech." Id.
I believe Senator Hollings meant that commercial speech should receive less protection than
noncommercial speech. In any case, this represented a change from Senator Hollings' earlier
support of a complete ban on autodialers, regardless of content. See supra notes 123-24 and
accompanying text; see also infra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.
138 See Press Release From the Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Statement of
President Bush, Fan. NEWS SERV., Dec. 20, 1991, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1979, 1979.
Nonetheless, President Bush believed the Act gave the FCC ample power to preserve legitimate
business practices, such as preexisting business relationships, according to changing market
conditions. Id.
139 See generally 47 U.S.C. § 227 (Supp. 1992).
14° Id. § 227(a).
141 Id. § 227(b)(1).
1421d. § 227(b) (1)(A).
143 Id. § 227(b) (1) (B). The Act makes an exception to this ban for emergency situations. Id.
144 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (1)(C).
145 „rd.§ 227 (b) (2). Under this authority, the FCC subsequently exempted calls not made for
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for recovery under § 227(b) (3) of a minimum of $500 by the called
consumer.' 46 Section 227(c) (3) further permitted the FCC to develop
a national database that listed numbers of individuals who did not wish
to be called by telemarketers. 147 The Act also included Representative
Markey's technical and procedural standards covering safety issues and
identification of solicitors using faxes and ADADs. 148
Most of the provisions of the Act have not been challenged.' 49 The
main problems with the Act have arisen with regard to the provision
making unlawful all unsolicited, commercial, automatically-dialed, pre-
recorded messages to residences.'" One observer has noted that the
TCPA is a prohibition on a manner of speech that, for some people,
is essential.' 51
III. THE TCPA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: MOSER V. FCC
The TCPA and similar state statutes have come under attack for
allegedly violating the First Amendment. 152 Plaintiffs have successfully
argued that such acts make impermissible content-based distinctions
between commercial and noncommercial ADAD messages."53 In addi-
tion, courts have held that these distinctions do not reasonably fit with
state interests in protecting residential privacy, because both types of
ADAD calls raise equal privacy concerns.' 54 Further, courts have noted
that no reasonable fit exists between state interests and the distinction
between recorded and live commercial speech, especially because com-
mercial ADAD messages make up such a small percentage of all tele-
marketing calls. 155 One court, however, has upheld a state statutory ban
a commercial purpose and calls made by tax-exempt organizations. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) (1),
(c) (4) (1993); Appellees' Brief at 23, Moser v. FCC, No. 93-35686 (9th Cir. filed Jan. 20, 1994).
146 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (3).
147 1d. § 227(c) (3).
148 See id. § 227(d); see also supra note 116 and accompanying text.
148 Of the five decided cases in which the constitutionality of the TCPA has been challenged,
four have dealt with the ban on sending commercial ADAD messages to residences, 42 U.S.C.
§ 227(b) (1) (13) in conjunction with (b) (2)(13) (i), and one dealt with the prohibition of junk
faxes, 42 U.S.C. § 227(b) (1) (C). See infra notes 157-239 and accompanying text for discussions
of these cases.
15° See 42 U.S.C. § 227(6)(1)(B); see also infra notes 157-239 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the cases that deal with this challenge.
151 Nightline: Computerized Auto-Dial Phone Selling (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 11, 1991)
(statement of Charles Hinkle), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
152 See, e.g., Lysaght v. New Jersey, 837 F. Supp. 646, 648 (D.N.J. 1993); Moser v. FCC, 811 F.
Supp. 541, 543 (D. Or. 1992); State v. Casino Mktg. Group, 491 N.W.2d 882, 883-84 (Minn. 1992),
cert. denied, Hall v. Minnesota, 113 S. Ct. 1648 (1993).
155 See Lysaght; 837 E Supp. at 648-49; Moser v. FCC, 826 F. Supp. 360, 363 (D. Or. 1993).
154 See Lysaght, 837 F. Supp. at 651; Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 365.
155 See Lysaght, 837 F. Supp. at 653; Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 366-67.
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on commercial ADAD messages as narrowly tailored to fit the state's
desired objectives. 156
A. The TCPA Is Declared Unconstitutional
In 1993, in Moser v. FCC, the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon held that § 227(b) (1) (B) of the TCPA, banning the
sending of ADAD messages to residential telephone lines, violated the
First Amendment of the Constitution. 157 Kathryn Moser and her hus-
band operated a small, local chimney sweep company, which used
ADADs to generate business.'" Moser sought to enjoin the FCC's en-
forcement of the TCPA against her company. 159 The court reasoned
that the TCPA drew a distinction between commercial and noncom-
mercial ADAD messages and determined that this distinction was based
solely on content. 16° In addition, the court observed that no reasonable
fit existed between Congress's interest in protecting residential privacy
and the restrictions of the TCPA.' 6 ' The court reasoned that both
commercial and noncommercial ADAD calls caused the same invasion
of privacy.'" Furthermore, the court stated that the ban on ADAD
messages only slightly reduced the invasion of privacy caused by all
telemarketing techniques when considered together, including live
calls. 163 The court held that the total ban of commercial ADAD calls
was content-based, did not reasonably fit with the goals of the Act, and
therefore, violated the First Amendment.' Thus, the court granted
Moser's request for summary judgment on the injunction issue.' 65
The court initially determined that the TCPA was not content-neu-
tral, because the Act drew distinctions between commercial and non-
commercial messages." Furthermore, because the Act distinguished
solely based on the content of the speech, it could not be classified as
a legitimate time, place or manner restriction on protected speech. 167
156 See Casino Mktg., 491 N.W.2d at 891.
'Moser v. FCC, 826 F. Supp. 360, 367 (D. Or. 1993), appeal docketed, No. 93-35686 (9th
Cir. 1994).
166 See Moser, 811 F. Supp. at 542. Kathryn Moser was also the president of the National
Association of Telephone Operators (NATO), also a plaintiff in the case. Id.
169 See Moser, 826 F Supp. at 361.
160 See id. at 363.
161
 See id. at 365.
162
 See id.
163 See id. at 366-67.
164 See Moser, 826 F. Supp at 367.
165 Id. at 361, 367. The Masers and NATO had been granted a preliminary injunction
preventing enforcement of the TCPA. Moser, 811 F. Supp. at 546.
166 Moser, 826 E Supp. at 363.
1671d.
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The court then determined that the TCPA constituted an invalid re-
striction on commercial speech under the Central Hudson-Fox test. 168
First, according to the court, distinguishing between commercial
and noncommercial speech failed to further the protection of pri-
vacy. 169 The court reasoned that both commercial and noncommercial
ADAD calls triggered the same ring of the telephone, and both equally
invaded the home and risked interrupting the recipient's privacy.'"
Further, the court observed that both types of speech raised the same
privacy issues that concerned Congress—depriving the recipient of
"human interplay," filling answering machines and interfering with
emergency telephone numbers.'" The court concluded that, as in City
of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., a distinction based solely on
commercial speech's presumed low value in First Amendment tradi-
tion failed to justify a restriction of commercial speech.'"
Second, the court determined that no reasonable fit existed be-
tween the stated goals of the TCPA and the distinction between re-
corded and live commercial speech. 17" The court recognized the govern-
ment's substantial interest in promoting residential privacy.'" According
to the court, the "shrill ring" of the telephone was uniquely intrusive,
because it demanded to be answered.'" The court concluded, however,
that no reasonable fit existed between the interest in privacy the gov-
ernment sought to further by the enactment of the TCPA and the
means chosen to promote that end.'" The court based this conclusion
on the fact that recorded messages composed less than three percent
of all telemarketing calls received by Americans.'" The court stated
that the end targeted by the TCPA would have been a slight reduction
in the number of unsolicited, invasive commercial calls placed to
1 " Id. at 364.
160 Id. at 365.
179 Id. The district court noted that House committee reports, which suggested that nonprofit
solicitations are lesS intrusive than commercial solicitations, were made with regard to a version
of H.R. 1304 that did not contain a ban on ADAD messages, and did nothing more than suggest
telemarketing legislation was needed because of the overall increase in volume of unsolicited
calls. Id.
171 See Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 365.
172 See id.
173 Id. at 365, 367. A House Report prepared by the Committee on Energy and Commerce
found that in a survey 70% of respondents found calls from a computer trying to sell something
very annoying, while only 67% found phone calls from people trying to sell things more annoying.
H.R. Rio'. No, 317, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1991). The Moser court held that a total ban on one
form of commercial speech based on a statistical distinction of 3% fails the reasonable fit test.
826 F. Supp. at 366.
174 Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 364.
175 .m.
176 Id. at 365.
177 1d. at 366-67.
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residential telephone owners. 178 The court observed, however, that the
means of accomplishing this was the total suppression of commercial
speech of businesses that used ADADs, while noncommercial and
nonprofit ADAD messages and commercial speech delivered by live
operators were permitted. 179 The court further noted that the govern-
ment failed to consider less burdensome alternatives to achieve its
ends.'" Based on all of these reasons, the court concluded that the
TCPA placed an unconstitutional restriction on protected commercial
speech in violation of the First Amendment. 18 '
B. State Challenges to ADAD Regulation
In the earlier case of Moser v. Frohnmayer, the Mosers won a
challenge in the Supreme Court of Oregon to the state constitutional-
ity of a statute dealing with ADADs. 182 The Mosers sought a declaratory
judgment that a statute making ADAD commercial messages unlawful
violated the freedom of speech provision in the Oregon Constitu-
tion.'" In applying state case law as precedent, the Supreme Court of
Oregon held that the ban did not fit into any established historical
exception to its protection of free speech. 184 In addition, the court
stated that the ban aimed at the speech itself, rather than the preven-
tion of an identified actual harm or effect. 185 Therefore, the Supreme
Court of Oregon declared the statute unconstitutional.'"
State statutes similar to the TCPA have been challenged thus far
in only two additional states. 187
 In 1993, in State v. Casino Marketing
Group, the Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld, on interlocutory
appeal, the constitutionality of a state statute that banned ADAD mes-
sages.' 88 The regulations included prohibitions of ADADs unless the
178 See id. at 367.
178 See Moser; 826 F. Supp. at 367.
180 Id. Congress had found that banning ADAD calls was the only effective means of pro-
tecting telephone consumers from this nuisance and privacy invasion." S. 1462, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess, § 2(12), as reported in 137 CONG. REC. HI 1,307 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991).
181 See Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 367.
182 Moser v. Frohnmayer, 845 P.2d 1284, 1285, 1288 (Or. 1993).
185 1d. at 1285. Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution provides that "[no] law shall
be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or
print freely on any subject whatever." OR. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
' 84 Frohnmayer, 845 P.2d at 1287.
185 1d. at 1288. Although presumably directed at invasion of privacy, the statute did not
identify, expressly or by clear implication, a substantial harm that the law sought to ameliorate.
See id. at 1291 (Graber, J., concurring in part and specially concurring in part).
188 See id. at 1288.
187 See Lysaght v. New Jersey, 837 F. Supp. 646, 648 (D.NJ. 1993); State v. Casino Mktg. Group,
491 N.W.2d 882, 884-85 (Minn. 1992), cert. denied, Hall v. Minnesota, 113 S. CL 1648 (1993).
188 See Casino Mktg., 491 N.W.2d at 884, 891-92.
December 1994]	 TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 	 105
caller had the prior consent of the recipient or if the message had been
immediately preceded by a live operator who had obtained the consent
of the recipient.' 89 A telephone solicitor enjoined from using ADADs
appealed, claiming that the statute violated the First Amendment.' 9°
The court observed that although the ADAD statute regulated a type
of commercial speech, it did not ban ADAD messages completely,
because a company or individual could still use an ADAD if it obtained
consent through an operator."' In addition, in applying the Central
Hudson-Fox test, the court reasoned that commercial ADAD calls intol-
erably invaded residential privacy because they were more efficient and
less discriminating than calls by live operators.'92 Thus, the court con-
cluded that a reasonable fit existed between the state's interest in
protecting privacy and the means by which the state sought to achieve
that goal.' 93 The court therefore upheld the constitutionality of the
ADAD statute.'"
In applying the Central Hudson-Fox test, the court assumed both
the lawfulness of the messages conveyed by ADADs, and the legitimacy
of the state's substantial interest in protection of residential privacy
underlying its statute.' 95 Proceeding to the third part of the test, the
court determined that the ADAD statute directly advanced this privacy
interest.' The problem, according to the court, was not solely with the
offensiveness of the content of the message.' 91 Rather, the coupling of
commercial telephone solicitation with a surprisingly efficient and
indiscriminate method of distribution resulted in a method of convey-
ing commercial speech that intolerably invaded residential privacy. 199
ADADs, according to the court, forced the consumer to listen to at
1 " MINN. STAT. ANN. g 325E.27 (West 1994).
19° See Lysaght, 837 F. Supp. at 883-84.
191 See id. at 886-87. The court characterized this statute as a reasonable time, place and
manner restriction. Id. at 886. The time consideration resulted in a limit on the hours of
Permissible use of ADADs. See MINK. STAT. ANN. § 325E.30. The statute is a result of a place
consideration, because no place is immune from the intrusion of an ADAD. Casino Mktg., 491
N.W.2d at 886. The court stated that the need for consent in advance or by an operator is justified
as a manner restriction. Id. at 887.
192 See Casino Mktg., 491 N.W.2d at 887-88.
199 See id. at 891.
194 See id. at 891-92.
195 Id. at 887-88, Minnesota also advanced the substantial interest of prevention of telemar-
keting fraud, but the court found that requiring live operators did not directly advance this
interest. See id.
196 1d. at 888.
197 Casino Mktg., 491 N.W.2d at 888.
1" Id. The court rejected the defendants' argument that a consumer could decline an ADAD
call simply by hanging up. Id. at 889.
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least some of the message in the privacy of his or her own non-public
home.'"
The court pointed out what it identified as two fundamental
differences between ADAD-generated calls and calls generated by live
operators—ADADs reach more households more quickly and select
households randomly. 2" The court reasoned that live operators bal-
anced this efficiency and indiscriminate calling, reducing the number
of calls, and therefore increasing residential privacy. 201 Furthermore,
the court characterized the contention that the ADAD statute failed to
directly advance the state's interest because commercial solicitations
by live operators or by ADADs equally invade residential privacy as
"overly simplistic. " 202
The court concluded that a regulation of commercial speech did
not fail to directly advance the state's substantial interest merely be-
cause it did not completely eliminate the problems the regulations
sought to address. 203 The court used this reasoning to dismiss the
contention that the ADAD statute failed to directly advance the state's
interest because of its statutory exception of noncommercial solicita-
tions.204 The court then concluded, under the final part of the Central
Hudson-Fox test, that because Minnesota neither completely banned
ADADs nor restricted solicitations by live operators, the statute was
narrowly tailored and constituted a reasonable fit with the statute's
desired objectives. 205
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Tomljanovich
argued that the statute's restriction of commercial speech did not directly
advance the state's interests.2°6 According to Justice Tomijanovich, the
live operator requirement advanced the interest in freedom from the
1" Id.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 890.
202 Casino Mktg., 491 N.W.2d at 890. This was a major point in Moser v. FCC and Lysaght IL
New Jersey. Lysaght, 837 F. Supp. 646, 653 (D.N.J. 1993); Moser, 826 E Supp. 360, 367 (D. Or.
1993), appeal docketed, No, 93-35686 (9th Cir. 1994). The Casino Marketing court somewhat
confusingly asserted that the quality of the intrusion of a live solicitation versus an ADAD message
is different, although the degree to which privacy is invaded by any particular call may be the
same. 491 N.W.2d at 890.
203 See Casino Mktg., 491 N.W.2d at 890 (citing Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism
Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 342-43 (1986); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S.
490, 510-12 (1981)).
204 1d. The Supreme Court of Minnesota read the regulatory scope of this statute to be limited
to commercial speech, and to not include calls made by charitable, religious and educational
organizations. Id. at 886. The court reasoned that the state is free to believe that commercial calls
pose a more acute threat to privacy than other types of calls to which the community may attribute
more value. Id. at 890-91.
205 Id, at 891.
206 1d. at 892 (Tornljanovich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ring of the telephone only incidentally, if at all. 207justice Tomljanovich
reasoned that, once the called person picked up the telephone, the
invasion of privacy has already occurred, regardless of whether the
caller was an ADAD or a live person." Additionally, Justice Tom-
ljanovich suggested that people may be able to hang up on machines
more easily than they could on live operators. 2°9
The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that a statutory ban on
unintroduced commercial ADAD messages was constitutional. 211) The
court reasoned that having live operators introduce ADAD calls bal-
anced efficiency with residential privacy, thus creating a narrowly tai-
lored regulation carefully calculated to advance the state's substantial
interest. 21 As a result, the court upheld the state prohibition on the
use of unintroduced ADAD messages. 2 ' 2
In 1993, in Lysaght v. New Jersey, the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey struck down a New Jersey statute that
banned commercial ADAD solicitations without the consent of the
called party. 213 The plaintiffs, two self-employed independent contrac-
tors, sought to enjoin the state of New jersey from enforcing its ban as
a violation of the First Amendment. 2" The court first reasoned that the
distinction, based solely on the commercial or noncommercial nature
of the speech, was content-based. 2 ' 5 The court then reasoned that,
because commercial and noncommercial ADAD messages invaded the
home equally, the perceived low value of commercial speech provided
the only basis for the distinction. 216 The court concluded that this did
not comprise a sufficient justification for the ban on commercial ADAD
messages. 217 In addition, the court determined that the statute failed
the Central Hudson-Fox test because no reasonable fit existed between
the state's interest in privacy, and the distinctions between commercial
207 Id. (Tomljanovich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
209 Casino Mktg., 491 N.W.2d at 892 (Tomljanovich, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
209 Id. (Tomljanovich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
219 Id. at 891-92.
211 See id. at 890-91.
212 See id. at 891-92. The Casino Marketing court remanded the case for a determination of
whether the prerecorded messages were accurate or false and misleading. Id. at 892.
219 837 F. Supp. 646,648,654 (D.NJ. 1993).
214 /d. at 647-48. Dennis Lysaght and Michael Berardi were described as independent con-
tractors who marketed memorial services for certain cemeteries. See Paul M. Alberta, New Jersey
Telemarketers Contesting Constitutionality of Autodialer, DM NEWS, Nov. 8,1993, at 3. The National
Association of Telephone Operators, a plaintiff in Moser, was also a plaintiff in Lysaght. Id.
215 Lysaght, 837 F, Supp. at 648-49. The court rejected arguments that the statute was a
content-neutral, reasonable time, place or manner restriction. Id. at 649.
'M. at 651.
2171d.
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and noncommercial ADAD messages and between live and recorded
commercial speech.'" Thus, the court enjoined New Jersey from en-
forcing its statute.'"
The court determined that, like the distinction between newsracks
in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., the distinction based
solely on whether the ADAD message was commercial or noncommer-
cial was content-based.'" Because the state could not justify the statute
as a reasonable restriction based on time, place or manner, the court
next analyzed the restriction on commercial speech under the Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission test."' Con-
ceding that the final stage was a close question, the court concluded
that the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech
did not reasonably fit with the state interest in protecting residential
privacy. 222
 The court observed, as the Moser v. Frohnmayer court had,
that both commercial and noncommercial ADAD messages equally
disrupted privacy in the home with the same rings and interruptions. 22"
Therefore, as in Discovery Network, the Lysaght court observed that the
perceived low value of commercial speech provided the only basis for
distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial ADAD mes-
sages, an impermissible justification for a complete ban on the com-
mercial messages. 224
 The court concluded that more complaints about
commercial calls did not necessarily mean a greater frequency of such
calls.'" According to the court, the mere offensiveness or annoyance
of commercial calls did not, by itself, sufficiently justify a prohibition
of commercial speech.'" The court observed that this statute did not
make merely a distinction among different types of commercial speech,
as in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego or Posadas de Puerto Rico
Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, but a discrimination between
commercial and noncommercial speech. 227
Echoing Moser, the court observed that the distinction between
ADAD-delivered messages and messages delivered or introduced by
live persons bore little relation to the interests asserted by the state,
218 See id.
219 See id. at 654.
220 Lysaght, 837 F. Supp. at 648-49.
221 /c/. at 649. The parties did not dispute the state's asserted interest in the promotion of
residential privacy. Id.
2221d at 651,
225 1d. (citing Moser v. FCC, 826 F. Stipp. 360, 366 (D. Or. 1993).
224 1d.
225 Lysaght, 837 F. Supp. at 651.
226 See id. at 652; Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71-72 (1983).
227 Lysaght, 837 F. Supp. at 652 (quoting Discovery Network., 113 S. Ct. at 1514 n.20).
(citing City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1516 (1993)).
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and that, therefore, no reasonable fit existed. 228 The court reasoned
that all telemarketing calls, whether live or by machine, threatened the
privacy of the home, because once the person being called picked up
the phone, the invasion of privacy had already occurred. 229
The court held that the New Jersey ADAD statute violated the First
Amendment."' According to the court, the statute, similar to the TCPA,
was content-based, and therefore, did not constitute a legitimate re-
striction on the time, place or manner of protected speech."' The
distinction it made between commercial and noncommercial speech
did not sufficiently justify the ADAD ban. 232 The court also reasoned
that the distinctions between commercial and noncommercial ADAD
messages and between live and recorded calls did not relate to the
goals of the statute, because all telemarketing calls were invasive."'
Therefore, the court enjoined the state from enforcing its law."'
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE MOSER V. FCC DECISION AND ALTERNATIVES
TO THE TCPA
The protection of residential privacy is a legitimate state interest. 235
The two primary distinctions made by the TCPA, however, bear little
relation to that interest. First, the distinction between commercial and
noncommercial ADAD messages is based on content, unconstitution-
ally relying on a perceived lower value of commercial speech. 236 In
actuality, both types of ADAD messages cause the same problems and
the same invasion of privacy.'" Second, no reasonable fit exists between
the distinction between live and recorded solicitations and the goal of
protecting privacy. 238 Again, both types of calls disturb the tranquillity
of the home. In addition, ADADs account for only about three percent
of all telemarketing calls. 239 In fact, the TCPA fails to regulate most of
228 Id. at 653.
229 Id.
as See id. at 648, 654.
231 Id. at 648-49.
232 See Lysaght, 837 F. Supp. at 651.
233 See id. at 651, 653,
234 Id. at 654.
235 SeeNadel, supra note 17, at 102; see also Lysaght v. New jersey, 837 F. Supp. 646, 649 (D.NJ.
1993); Moser v. FCC, 826 F. Supp. 360, 364 (D. Or. 1993), appeal docketed, No. 93-35686 (9th Cir.
1994); State v. Casino Mktg. Group, 491 N.W.2d 882, 888 (Minn. 1992).
239 See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1516 (1993);
Lysaght, 837 F. Supp. at 651; Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 365.
237 See Lysaght, 837 F. Supp, at 651; Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 365.
2" See Lysaght, 837 F. Supp. at 653; Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 366.
299 See Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 366-67.
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the calls that invade residential privacy. In reality, the TCPA has the
hardest impact on small businesses who cannot afford live operators
and prefer cost-efficient ADADs. Finally, many new technologies pro-
vide alternatives to a complete ban, indicating that Congress has not
chosen a solution that fairly balances consumers' interest in privacy
with ADAD users' rights to free speech.
A. The TCPA as a Content -Based Distinction
Governmental interest in protecting the tranquillity of the home
has always been "of the highest order." 24° The United States Supreme
Court has recognized that government may properly act to prohibit
intrusion into the privacy of the home, where people are often "cap-
tives" of unwelcome views and ideas. 24 ' An individual, however, can
avoid an ADAD message simply and quickly by hanging up, just as he
or she can avoid a printed advertisement by averting his or her eyes. 242
The Mosers concede that ADAD messages are annoying, but they
point out that most advertising is a nuisance, and that just as the
Mosers have a right to call, consumers have the right to hang Up. 243 In
addition, the FCC, in a study conducted in 1980, observed that, al-
though many people find telemarketing annoying, many people also
purchase the goods offered. 244 According to Joan Mullen, President of
the American Telemarketing Association, telemarketing provides a
service to housebound people, allowing them to conduct business,
make purchases and obtain information. 245 Ms. Mullen also insists that,
with better education of telemarketers regarding courtesy and target-
ing of consumer interests, telemarketing will continue to be a service,
rather than an intrusion. 246 An organization trying to sell something
has an incentive to direct calls to those likely to be interested, limit its
calls to reasonable hours, and to conduct its calls, live or prerecorded,
240 See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980).
241 See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 737-38 (1970).
242 Compare Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (holding that persons confronted
with offensive words on jacket could avert their eyes to avoid further bombardment of their
sensibilities) with State v. Casino Mktg. Group, 491 N.W.2d 882, 889 (Minn. 1992) (holding that
subscriber confronted with ADAD message would be "forced to answer the telephone and receive
at least part of the message before he or she can hang up"). Even in the case of offensive printed
materials, there must be some limited exposure to determine that the message or words are
offensive. But, in either case, that exposure can be terminated very quickly, either by averting
the eyes or hanging up the phone.
293 Nighiline, supra note 151 (statement of Kathy Moser).
244 Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1036 (1980).
245 See Lauerman, Mira note 85, at 20.
246 See id.
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in an ethical and courteous manner. 247 In addition, the Direct Market-
ing Association and some insurers have implemented private guide-
lines, not subject to First Amendment challenges. 248
The Moser decision highlighted several problems with the TCPA.
First, the TCPA distinguishes between forms of solicitation based on
content. Almost fifteen years ago, the Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare, as well as many business and industry associations,
began questioning the lawfulness of distinguishing between unsolicited
commercial calls and those of a nonprofit or political nature. 249 The
TCPA exempts charities, politicians, research organizations and other
nonprofit groups from the ban on ADAD messages to residences. 2"
While it is understandable that emergency numbers should be kept
open for public safety concerns, or that cellular phones which charge
the call receiver should not be called because they impose involuntary
payments, no clear public concern requires the inclusion of commer-
cial calls to residences among the prohibitions of ADAD use. 251 Com-
mercial calls do not pose safety threats or impose unsolicited expenses
on consumers. Moreover, commercial and noncommercial calls inflict
the same disturbance upon residential privacy. 252 They present the
same concerns with filling answering machines and interfering with
emergency and health-related phone numbers. 2" Even in 1980, the
FCC, in a report on unsolicited telemarketing, recognized that all
solicitation calling—whether for charitable, political or business pur-
poses—implicates similar concerns regarding privacy. 254 In short, al-
though the state interest in protecting privacy is compelling, the dis-
tinction between commercial ADAD messages and noncommercial
ADAD messages does not facilitate the achievement of that objective. 255
247 See Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d at 1037.
245 See Carole King, Marketers Debate Automated Dialing Equipment, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, July
29, 1991, at 15.
245 See Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d at 1025, 1027.
25° See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (2) (111)(i), as enacted by 47 C.F.R. § 62.1200(c) (1), (c) (4) (1993).
251 See Ann Marie Arcadi, Note, What About the Lucky Leprechaun?: An Argument Against "The
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991," 1991 CoLum. Bus. L. Rev, 417, 429 (1991) ("Even
the manufacturers of the [ADADs] agree and recommend that the FCC. regulate the usage of
such machines by requiring the machines to quickly disconnect, omit dialing emergency tele-
phone numbers and refrain from internally generating random or sequential numbers to be
dialed.").
252 Moser v. FCC, 811 F. Supp. 541, 545 (D. Or. 1992).
15S
254 Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1035 (1980).
255 See Luten, supra note 18, at 153. Like ADAD messages, faxes are also banned by the TCPA.
See 42 U.S.C. § 227(b) (1)(C) (Stipp. 1992). Unlike ADADs, however, faxes impose costs on the
recipient. This is similar to ADADs that call cellular phones. Junk faxes use the recipient's fax
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As the Moser court concluded, no reasonable time, place or man-
ner restriction justifies the distinction of commercial versus noncom-
mercial ADAD calls. In fact, Senator Hollings did not distinguish, and
carefully avoided drawing any distinctions based on content, between
commercial and noncommercial ADAD calls in his original bill. 256
 In
the committee report on S. 1462, Senator Hollings wrote that S. 1462
was an example of a reasonable time, place and manner restriction on
speech because (at that time) it applied equally to all automated
messages whether of a commercial, political, charitable or other na-
ture.2" Among the findings listed in Senator Hollings' bill was that
evidence compiled by Congress indicated that residential telephone
subscribers considered ADAD calls, regardless of content or the initiator
of the message, a nuisance and an invasion of privacy.258 By only banning
ADADs used in commercial speech, Congress made a judgment about
the content of the message, rather than the use of the ADADs. 259
Often noncommercial recordings are as offensive as for-profit
calls, if not more so. The FCC, in its 1980 report on telemarketing,
stated that no evidence existed that a telephone subscriber would find
an advertising message more offensive than a request for a charitable
machine to print material on the recipient's own paper and own time. The costs of the paper,
due to a large number of solicitors, build up over time. See Jim Fisher, Shifting Costs Behind the
Mask of Free Speech, LEWISTON MORNING Tins., Dec. 29, 1993, at 4A. One estimate prices fax
paper at $10 per roll. See Telephone Calls From Computers May Be Curbed By Lawmakers,INvEsToa'S
DAILY, Aug. 15, 1991, at 25. In effect, companies are actually trying to shift some of the costs of
their promotional materials to consumers, without consumers' permission. See Fisher, supra, at
4A; Reuters, Ban Is Upheld on Fax Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1993, at 50.
In 1994, the United States District Court for the District of Oregon upheld the constitution-
ality of the Act's ban of unsolicited faxes. Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 844 F. Supp. 632,
634, 640 (D. Or. 1994). Five companies in Oregon sought an injunction against the FCC to enjoin
enforcement of the TCPA's fax provisions. Id. The court listed the shifting of costs and the
unwanted occupation of recipient's fax machines as substantial interests that Congress sought to
address with its ban. See id. at 636-37. In addition, the court explained that the statute was
narrowly tailored to serve these interests because it banned all messages that advertised the
commercial availability or quality of property, goods or services, without distinguishing between
commercial and nonprofit messengers. Id. at 637. The court therefore granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss the companies' case. Id. at 634, 640.
Even when courts uphold the fax ban, they have not construed it liberally. SeeLutz Appellate
Servs. v. Curry, No. 94-3985, 1994 WL 395304, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 1994) (holding that
unsolicited help-wanted faxes did not fall within ban because they advertise employment oppor-
tunities, not property, goods or services).
2' See 137 CONG. REC. 516,206 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings); S. REP.
No. 178, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1971.
257 S. REP. No. 178, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 6 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S,C.CA.N. at 1971,
1974; see also 137 CONG. Ric. 518,784 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
258 5. 1462, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(10) (1991), as reported in 137 CONG. REC. H11,307 (daily
ed. Nov. 26, 1991).
259 See Andrews, supra note 88, at Dl.
December 1994]	 TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECHON AG7' 	 113
contribution or a political message or solicitation. 26° For example, a
recording from a public interest group might more subtlely reach out
to the sympathies of a potential donor than would a straightforward
advertisement for a product or service. A politician's permissible ADAD
messages disturb the home to solicit funds for his or her campaign just
as do commercial ADADs (this makes it more apparent why this excep-
tion was included in the Act passed by a Congress that frequently needs
to solicit reelection con tributions). 261 While charities certainly serve the
public good, nothing supports the assumption that all noncommercial
calls inherently serve the public good (a politician's ADAD call more
than likely serves the politician). In addition, the TCPA makes the
complementary assumption that all commercial speech is inherently
of less value to the public good than noncommercial speech. Yet, the
United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that consumers'
interest in the free flow of commercial information may equal, if not
exceed, their interest in other sorts of speech. 262 Like the differentia-
tion between varieties of newsracks in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc., the distinction among types of ADAD calls "bears no
relationship whatsoever' to Congress's interest in protecting privacy. 263
If a telemarketing call is intrusive, it is no less intrusive if it is a non-
commercial ADAD message than if it is a commercial ADAD message. 264
In State v. Casino Marketing Group, the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota relied on the perceived greater value to the public good of chari-
table contributions, as compared to profits derived from commercial
messages.265 The FCC has written that activities of market research or
polling organizations are not invasive of residential privacy rights.266
Congress relied on the assumption that unsolicited calls for the pur-
pose of obtaining the called party's business are regarded by consum-
ers as inherently more intrusive and objectionable than unsolicited
26° Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 77 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1035 (1980).
261 See Arcadi, supra note 251, at 426. According to Jeff Travis, a California-based ADAD
manufacturer, he sells ADADs to politicians to get themselves reelected, and they then exclude
themselves from what they call Intrusive" calls banned by the Act. See King, supra note 248, at 15.
262 See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1975).
253 See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1514 (1993); Appellees'
Brief at 26, Moser v. FCC, No. 93-35686 (9th Cir. filed Jan. 20, 1994).
"4 See Luten, supra note 18, at 153.
265 491 N.W.2d 882, 890 (Minn. 1992); see also Lysaght v. New Jersey, 837 F. Supp. 646, 652
n.9 (D.NJ, 1993) (Casino Marketing court "relied in part on the perceived greater value of
charitable contributions as contrasted with profit generated through commercial messages.").
266 See Diane K. Bowers, The Telephone Consumer Protection Act, MARKETING RESEARCH: A
MAGAZINE OF MANAGEMENT & APPLICATIONS TM, June 1993, at 44.
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calls seeking the called party's support for a political or not-for-profit
cause. 267 This type of justification—assigning a greater value to non-
commercial speech than commercial speech—has been directly under-
mined by Discovery Network, in which the United States Supreme Court
held that this content distinction fails to justify suppressing only com-
mercial speech. 268 If the governmental purpose in regulating ADADs
is to protect residential privacy, no rational reason exists to suggest that
limiting only commercial calls (or ADAD calls) will achieve that goal
to any greater degree than limiting all ADAD messages. 269
B. The 'TCPA's Arbitrary Distinction Between Live and Recorded Calls
1. The Lack of a Reasonable Fit
According to Moser v. FCC, in addition to content-based distinc-
tions, the TCPA also makes an arbitrary division between live and
prerecorded calls. Though the distinction between prerecorded mes-
sages and live people may be justified as a reasonable restriction on
the manner of delivery, no reasonable fit exists between protecting
privacy and banning all commercial ADAD messages. 27° As the Moser
court observed, the Act raises serious questions as to whether such a
heavy burden on this one kind of constitutionally-protected commer-
cial speech is a reasonable fit with the reduction of such a small
percentage of the invasive calls targeted by Congress. 27 ' Banning ADADs
does not protect privacy, but makes commercial speech more expen-
sive for companies that will continue to invade the home through live
operators. 272 In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission, the United States Supreme Court stated that it carefully
reviews regulations that completely suppress commercial speech in
order to pursue a non-speech related policy.273 By totally outlawing only
this one ADAD technology, Congress has banned a form of commercial
267 Allan R. Adler, Tight Rein on Unwanted Calls, TEXAS LAW., May 24, 1993, at 16.
268 City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1516 (1993); see also
Appellees' Brief at 25-26, Moser v. FCC, No. 93-35686 (9th Cir. filed Jan. 20, 1994).
269 See Luten, supra note 18, at 153.
270 See Moser v. FCC, 826 F. Supp. 360, 363-64, 367 (D. Or. 1993), appeal docketed, No.
93-35686 (9th Cir. 1994).
271 Moser v. FCC, 811 F. Supp. 541, 545 (D. Or. 1992); Appellees' Brief at 11-12, Moser (No.
93-35686).
272 See State v. Casino Mktg. Group, 491 N.W.2d 882, 892 (Minn. 1992) (Tomljanovich, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
275 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980).
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speech for the sake of slightly reducing the number of telephone
solicitations. 274
The Moser court pointed out that both types of calls trigger the
same ring and equally disturb the peacefulness and privacy of the
home. 275 As the Mosers contended in their Appellee's Brief, "a ringing
phone is a ringing phone is a ringing phone. "275 In his dissent in State
v. Casino Marketing Group, Justice Tomljanovich argued that once the
person being called picks up the telephone, his or her privacy has
already been interrupted, regardless of whether the caller is a person
or an ADAD.277 Senator Hollings suggested that ADAD calls clearly are
a greater nuisance and invasion of privacy than calls by live persons. 278
He claimed that automated calls cannot interact with the consumer,
except in preprogrammed ways; consequently, they do not allow the
caller to feel the frustration of the called party. 279 They are also annoy-
ing in that they do not disconnect the line after the consumer hangs
up the telephone, and when no one is available to answer the auto-
mated call, they may fill entire answering machine tapes with their
messages."°Technology, however, has since provided for disconnection
after the customer hangs up. 281 Also, answering machines can now limit
the length of an individual caller's message. As for the complaint that
there is no interaction, Senator Hollings is a bit behind the times.
Money and banking, transportation scheduling and other daily activi-
ties are universally conducted by person-to-computer interaction, often
more efficiently than person-to-person dealings. The fact that these
events do not cause unbearable, widespread frustration provides sup-
port for the proposition that people are not necessarily bothered by a
lack of interaction.
In addition, residential privacy, not avoidance of frustration with
ADAD calls, was the interest Congress put forward in support of its ban
on ADADs.282 Senator Hollings mysteriously derived the notion that not
being allowed to vent one's frustration constitutes a nuisance that
warrants regulation. Senator Hollings quotes Steve Hamm, Adminis-
trator of the South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs, for
274 See Moser, 811 F. Supp. at 545.
275 See Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 365.
276 Appellees' Brief at 16, Moser (No. 93-35686).
277 491 N.W.2d 882, 892 (Minn. 1992) (Tornijanoyich, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
278 S. REP. No. 178, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1972.
279 1d. at 4-.5, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1972.
280 1d.
281 See Nightline, supra note 151 (statement of Ray Kolker).
282 Appellees' Brief at 17, Moser, No. 93-35686 (9th Cir. filed Jan. 20, 1994).
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support that consumers complain of the irritation they experience due
to their inability to show their frustration and anger from ADAD
calls. 283
 In effect, Senator Hollings expounded the irrational justifi-
cation for distinguishing among telemarketing calls that people receiv-
ing ADAD messages cannot get the same "sense of relief' that they
obtain by slamming down their telephones in innocent operators' ears
when they receive live calls. 284 One Representative believed that some-
how an individual can hold a live person more accountable than an
automated voice, if he or she interrupts your dinner. 285
 If anything, the
impersonality of the recording should make such a rejection easier. 288
The called party need not concern itself with how to make a polite
rejection or with hurting the feelings of the caller, who is probably just
trying to do his or her job to the best of his or her ability. 287 Robert
Bulmash, founder of Private Citizen, a group that crusades against
telemarketers, stated that the main concern of consumers is the fact
that telemarketers "barge" into homes, not the method by which they
do so.288
No one has demonstrated that less restrictive, better fitting meas-
ures are not available to alleviate the problems of telemarketing. 289 As
the City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. Court noted, reasonable
alternatives to a regulation directly relate to the issue of reasonable
fit. 29° Congress simply concluded that prohibiting ADAD calls to the
home poses the only effective way of protecting telephone consumers'
privacy. 29 ' Banning the use of ADADs for all commercial purposes
creates a much more severe measure than any of the technical and
procedural restrictions applicable to noncommercial ADAD calls or
live calls that equally invade residential privacy. 292
283 S. REP. No. 178, 102d Cong., 1st Sess, 4 n.3 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.CA.N. at 1972.
284 See id.
285
 137 CONG. REC. I-111,312 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Cooper).
288
 See Casino Mktg., 491 N,W.2d at 892 (Tomljanovich, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
287 See Appellees' Brief at 19, Moser, No. 93-35686 (9th Cir. filed Jan. 20, 1994).
288
 See Nightline, supra note 151 (statement of Robert Bulmash). Private Citizen sends to
telemarketers a list of names of consumers who agree they can be contacted by telemarketers if
they are paid one hundred dollars. Id.
289 See Arcadi, supra note 251, at 426.
29° City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1510 n.13 (1993).
291 S. 1462, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(12) (1991), as reported in 137 CONG. REG. 1111,307 (daily
ed. Nov. 26, 1991).
292 See Arcadi, supra note 251, at 425.
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2. Incidental Decrease of the Invasion of Privacy
Testimony at the Moser trial showed that the TCPA would not
affect the vast majority of telemarketing calls currently being placed.'"
Predictive-dialer systems, which use computers to dial many telephone
lines at the same time and connect the calls to live operators who either
deliver live messages or ask the recipient to listen to prerecorded
messages, place at least ninety percent of all telemarketing calls. 294
According to Ray Kolker, president of Kolker Systems, an ADAD manu-
facturer, ADADs comprise only about three percent of all telemarket-
ing calls.'" Yet, despite these statistics, the TCPA does not regulate
predictive dialers.'" As with the commercial newsracks in Discovery
Network, the benefit derived from the banning of commercial ADAD
messages can be considered "minute" and "paltry." 297 Like the permit-
ted newsracks in Discovery Network, predictive dialers, because of their
far greater number, are a far "greater culprit" for intruding into the
home than ADADs. 2" Charles Hinkle, the Mosers' attorney, observed
that the TCPA is analogous to Congress deciding motor vehicles pol-
lute the air, and then solving the problem by going after two-wheeled
mopeds.'" To reiterate, prohibiting such a small part of all telemarket-
ing calls does not reasonably fit with Congress's goal of protecting
residences from the intrusive ring of unwanted telephone solicitions.
Some supporters of the TCPA argue that underinclusion of all
types of calls does not, without more, mandate that the statute be
overturned."' In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of
253 Arthur Winston, DM and Commercial Speech, DM NEWS, Feb. 22, 1993, at 18. In fact, the
Senate committee report on S. 1462 noted that most telemarketers who had contacted the
committee did not use ADADs. S. REP. No. 178, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1991), reprinted in
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1975; Appellees' Brief at 14, Moser (No. 93-35686).
294 Winston, supra note 293, at 18; see also Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast, Dec.
29, 1992) (statement of Ray Kolker), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI file. While an
ADAD is capable of making 1,000 calls per day, a predictive dialer can make as many as 7,400
calls per hour. See Appellees' Brief at 7, Moser (No. 93-35686).
295 See Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 366-67. Because prerecorded messages make up less than three
percent of all telemarketing calls received by Americans, the number of prerecorded commercial
calls is accordingly an even smaller percentage of the total of all telemarketing calls. Lysaght v.
New jersey, 837 F. Supp. 646, 651 (D.Nj. 1993).
296 See Appellees' Brief at 8, Moser (No. 93-35686),
297 See Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct, at 1510; Appellees' Brief at 16, Moser (No. 93-35686).
298 See Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1515; Appellees' Brief at 16, Moser (No. 93-35686).
299 See Tim Mayer, Telecomputer Firm's Founder Battling Ban on His Machines, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Feb. 28, 1993, at IL
300 See Consuelo Lauda Kertz & Lisa Boardman Burnette, Telemarketing Tug-of-War: Balancing
Telephone Information Technology and the First Amendment with Consumer Protection and Privacy,
43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1029, 1064 n.244 (1992).
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Puerto Rico, for example, the United States Supreme Court upheld a
ban on the advertising of casino gambling, while the advertising of
other types of gambling was unregulated. 3" The Posadas Court rea-
soned, however, that because the government of Puerto Rico had the
power to regulate gambling, it could therefore regulate the advertising
of gambling as it saw fit. 302 There is no evidence that the underlying
conduct here, the sale of commercial products, could be banned
directly by the government, as could casino gambling. In addition,
Congress only has a right to regulate false or misleading advertising,
not all commercial advertising. The State v. Casino Marketing Group
court, citing Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, concluded that a
regulation of commercial speech does not fail to advance a state inter-
est just because it does not solve the whole problem." Unlike the
Metromedia Court's conclusion that offsite billboards created a more
serious problem than onsite billboards, however, no evidence shows
that ADADs cause more of a problem regarding invasion of privacy
than do live calls. Essentially, the TCPA's distinction between ADADs
and live operators does indeed reduce the invasion of privacy ever so
slightly, but the division seems to be an arbitrary, unreasonable method
of truly protecting consumers in their residences from all unwanted
calls.
C. Disparate Impact on Small Businesses
The TCPA has a disparate impact on smaller businesses who rely
on the use of ADADs as an inexpensive, time efficient way to generate
business." Using ADADs is cheaper than employing live operators,
and ADADs can reach more homes than can live operators." Though
ADAD calls make up only three percent of all telemarketing calls, for
many non-public, smaller companies ADADs provide the only realistic
method of obtaining business." Small businesses cannot afford live
301 Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 348 (1986).
302 /d. at 345-46. The Court held that the greater governmental power to completely ban
casino gambling necessarily included the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling. Id.
"State v. Casino Mktg. Group, 491 N.W.2d 882, 890 (Minn. 1992) (citing Metromedia, Inc.
v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 510-12 (1981)).
3°4 See Arcadi, supra note 251, at 426-28.
305
 See Nightline, supra note 151.
306 See Arcadi, supra note 251, at 427. According to Ray Kolker, president of Kolker-Systems,
a manufacturer of ADADs, nearly 99% of those who purchase ADADs are small businesses. Id. at
426. Predictive dialers, which make up a huge majority of automated telemarketing calls and are
unregulated by the TCPA, are primarily used by large businesses. SeeAppellees' Brief at 15, Moser
v. FCC, No. 93-35686 (9th Cir. filed Jan. 20, 1994).
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operators and predictive dialers as readily as large enterprises. 307 For
example, the plaintiffs in Lysaght generated about ninety-five percent
of their income through leads obtained by business resulting from the
use of ADADs.'c's This "poor person's form of advertising" generates
more business than other methods of advertising, despite many hang-
ups or annoyed consumers.' 09 Telemarketing gets a higher response
than direct mailings and is cheaper than using the postal system." 0 For
example, the Mosers' machine quickly paid for itself and even in-
creased business for the chimney sweep service.'" The Mosers and
other small businesses would suffer great economic losses if they were
forced to abandon the cost-effective ADADs.' 12
Moreover, the Act could potentially have a discouraging effect on
the research and development of new telemarketing and advertising
technologies.'" Representative Barney Frank, of Massachusetts, com-
plained on ABC News' television show Nightline that ADADs accom-
plish telemarketing more efficiently, more cheaply and more rapidly
than other methods of telemarketing, thereby increasing intrusions. 314
In a time when the government is trying to encourage small enterprises
to maximize their business, efficiency is not such a bad thing. If invest-
ment and capital will result in devices that will be unlawful, advances
that may be beneficial will be outweighed by risks of monetary losses.'"
307 See Appellees' Brief at 15 n.7, Moser (No. 93-35686).
3" See Alberta, supra note 214, at 3.
309 See Andrews, supra note 88, at Dl. A 1990 survey by Walker Research, Inc., found that
only 6% of telemarketing calls resulted in a sale, donation or appointment, while 61% were
refused at the beginning of the call, See Lauerman, supra note 85, at 20. Congress did express
some concern, though not enough, for small businesses by creating an exemption from the ADAD
prohibition for businesses with prior relationships with the consumer, and by mandating that if
the FCC created a database, it could not place an unreasonable financial burden on small
businesses. See 137 Conte. REC. 518,317 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Sen. Pressler); 47
U.S.C. § 227(c) (4) (B) (iii) (Supp, 1992).
510 See Lauerman, supra note 85, at 20. According to Lauerman, a phone call costs a nickel,
compared with 40 cents for the average piece of direct-mail advertising. Id.
311 See Arcadi, supra note 25 .1, at 427. Out of about 1500 calls a day, the Mosers get through
to about 500, leading to about eight to ten leads, which translates into seven or eight jobs per
day. Larry King Live, supra note 294 (statement of Kathryn Moser). As a result of the machine,
the Mosers' chimney sweep company earned a net of about $49,75 per job, instead of incurring
a net loss of about $100 with other advertising methods before they bought the ADAD. Id.
(statement of Kathryn Moser).
312 See Arcadi, supra note 251, at 427. The Mosers estimated that if they were to lose their
ADAD, they would lose 50 to 60% of their business. See Nightline, supra note 151 (statement of
Ron Moser).
313 See Arcadi, supra note 251, at 429.
314 Nightline, supra note 151 (statement of Rep. Barney Frank).
315 See Arcadi, supra note 251, at 429.
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D. Alternatives and New Technologies
Representative Frank stated on Nightline that his constituents most
often complained that ADADs left messages on answering machines,
did not disconnect quickly when the called party hangs up and, like a
"robot," increased the quantity of intrusions. 316 Most of these problems
have been resolved by noncontroversial provisions in the TCPA or by
new technologies. 317 Privacy, however, is still disturbed every time the
phone rings. Instead of a complete ban on ADAD commercial calls,
alternatives exist which would serve the desire for preserving residen-
tial privacy while still protecting the First Amendment rights of solicitors.
Technical and procedural standards are already in place for the
few exempted uses of ADADs. ADADs must, at the beginning of the
message, state clearly the name of the entity initiating the call, along
with the telephone number or address of the calling party. 318 In addi-
tion, the FCC has restricted the time of day during which telephone
solicitation to residences is permissible. 31g These requirements could
simply be applied to all ADAD messages. 3" As a result, consumers could
complain directly to the soliciting companies to let them know their
frustration or to ask not to be called again. In fact, H.R. 1304 did not
ban ADADs, but simply imposed such time, place and manner restric-
tions.m
In addition, the national database of people who wish not to be
contacted for live telemarketing calls could be used for unsolicited
prerecorded calls. Businesses, however, rejected this idea as a response
to unsolicited live telephone calls as too cumbersome and expensive. 322
316 Nightline, supra note 151. Representative Frank complained that if a person goes on
vacation, he or she may return to find many ADAD messages on his or her answering machine—to
which I say, has he never heard of fast forward? See id.
317 See Lysaght v. New Jersey, 837 F. Supp. 646, 647 (D.NJ. 1993); Larry King Live, supra note
294 (statement of Ray Kolker) ("in the old days, the old equipment did not hang up, but today
it does"); Nightline, supra note 151 (statement of Ray Kolker) ("with today's modern technology,
with digital voice recorders and that sort of thing, [ADADs] hang up instantaneously upon the
called party hang-up"); see also Appellees' Brief at 5, Moser v. FCC, No, 93-35686 (9th Cir. filed
Jan. 20, 1994).
318 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(d) (3) (Supp. 1992); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) (1993).
315 See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e) (1).
325 See Arcadi, supra note 251, at 425.
321 See H.R. 1304, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(d) (2) (1991), as reported in H.R. REP. No. 317,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1991).
322 Arthur Winston, The TCPA: A Half-Year (Almost) Review, DM NEWS, May 17, 1993, at 13.
Businesses estimated that a national list would cost $20 million to $80 million annually to operate.
Id. In addition, a fifth of all phone numbers change each year. Id. Currently, neither the TCPA
nor any FCC regulations provide guidance for businesses to avoid liability for unintentional
violations, such as calling a number that has been changed without notification. See Adler, supra
note 267, at 16.
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Alternatively, the FCC could require individual companies to maintain
their own ADAD do-not-call lists, subject to periodic inspection, similar
to the system that the FCC has implemented for live telemarketing
calls. 523
 This method has received support as being more effective,
easily implemented and relatively less costly than other proposed meth-
ods to curb unwanted telephone solicitations. 524 Although individual
company-maintained do-not-call databases would still require a con-
sumer to tell each individual company that he or she did not want to
receive calls, the databases, if monitored by the FCC, would be a step
toward reducing invasions of privacy without suppressing First Amend-
ment rights. Such company-specific do-not-call lists would not only ease
the minds of consumers, but would spare businesses the time and
expense of needless calls to consumers who would clearly be nonre-
sponsive to solicitations. 525
Better publicity regarding the availability of do-not-call databases
would likely increase their use as an effective tool against the invasion
of privacy inherent in all telemarketing. Recently, an aware consumer
brought the first known lawsuit seeking recovery under provisions of
A statewide database has been shown to work in Florida. See S. REP. No. 177, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. 19 (1991); Lauerman, supra note 85, at 20. Under Florida's system, consumers who do
not wish to receive telephone solicitations register with the State Department of Agriculture and
Consumer Services for a fee of $10. S. REP. No. 177, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1991); Lauerman,
supra note 85, at 20. Telecommunication companies must buy the list of these consumers and
refrain from calling those people on it. S. REP. No. 177, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1991);
Lauerman, supra note 85, at 20.
Representative Markey has urged the FCC to reconsider having a national database, instead
of the ineffective, individual company-maintained databases currently mandated by the FCC. See
Paul A. Alberta, House Hits DMers on Phone Usage, DM NEWS, July 25, 1994, at 1. Representative
Markey stated in a recent report that the telemarketing industry has not complied with the TCPA
and the FCC's company-specific do-not-call database provision. Edward J. Markey, Telemarketing
Law, CONGRESSIONAL PRESS RELEASES, Aug. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS
File; Alberta, supra, at 1.
323 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e) (2). See, e.g., Adler, supra note 267, at 16; Winston, supra note 322,
at 13; Barbara Woller, Steps to Take to Protect Your Privacy, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, July 20, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library GNS File.
To show good-faith compliance with the law, a telemarketer must: maintain a written policy
implementing its do-not-call procedures; inform and train telemarketing representatives; inform
subscribers of their right to be placed on the no-calls list; place a telephone subscriber on the
do-not-call list within a reasonable time after said request is made; and maintain that request for
a period after the request is made. Winston, supra note 322, at 13.
324 Winston, supra note 322 at 13.
325
 See Kertz & Burnette, supra note 300, at 1064. The Direct Marketing Association currently
provides a service whereby a consumer can have his or her name removed from national
advertising mailing lists or can receive fewer phone calls from national advertisers. See Woller,
supra note 323. According to Richard Barton, senior vice-president for government affairs for
the Direct Marketing Association, this service can probably remove a consumer from about 80 to
90% of all national telemarketing lists, but does not cover local companies. See Lauerman, supra
note 85, at 20.
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the TCPA.326
 Michael Jacobsen, a consumer advocate with the Center
for the Study of Commercialism, filed suit against Citibank Corp.,
claiming that the institution called him at home three times, two of
which occurred after he told them specifically not to call him again.'"
Mr. Jacobsen settled out of court for $750, but set a precedent that
consumers do have the power to protect their rights with these data-
bases.328
 Consumers, however, must clearly state that they want their
name or phone number in the database and keep track of the telemar-
keters to which they have made such a request; slamming down the
phone is insufficient. 829
 Jacobsen suggested the concept of a "do-call"
database as an alternative to do-not-call databases."° A do-call system
would prohibit ADAD messages unless a consumer added his or her
name to a "please-call-me" list, which companies could rent."' As a
reasonable manner restraint, a do-call database might be justified if it
applied to both commercial and noncommercial ADAD messages.
New technologies are being developed that do not play the pre-
recorded message without the consent of the individual called.'" In
one example, a called party would have to press "0" before hearing the
message."8s If the party did not wish to hear it, he or she could simply
hang up, causing minimal intrusion. Another possible solution from a
consumer perspective lies in the use of "smart" answering machines
that recognize preprogrammed numbers.'" "Caller Identification," a
variation on this screening of messages, displays the phone number of
the party placing the call, giving the called party the option of not
answering telephone numbers that begin with 800 or 900 or are oth-
erwise unfamiliar.'" If the FCC required all autodialers to be on one
exchange, technology allowing a consumer to block incoming calls
from that exchange would likely follow.'"
Still another solution, according to Ray Kolker, an ADAD manu-
facturer, would be to have consumers pay a small monthly fee to have
326 See John Eckhouse, How to Make Telemarketers Stop Calling, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 18, 1993, at Bl.
327 See id.
328





552 See, e.g., Arcadi, supra note 251, at 430-31; Lauerman, supra note 85, at 20; Nadel, supra
note 17, at 123-24.
555 See Arcadi, supra note 251, at 430-31; King, supra note 248, at 15.
334 See Lauerman, supra note 85, at 20.
555 See Larry King Live, supra note 294 (statement of Ray Kolker); Lauerman, supra note 85,
at 20.
3" See 137 CoNc. REC. 58,992 (daily ed. June 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. Pressler); Putting
Limits on Autodialers, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 22, 1991, at 24.
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a message play when automatic dialers call.'" This message to the
business could say something like, "The number you have reached
does not accept telemarketing calls.""s 8 Kolker claimed this would auto-
matically block all telemarketing calls, whether live or automatic.'s°
Another idea is a device available upon consumer request, that emits
a short, recognizable do-not-call tone to any party who calls, before the
telephone rings in the called party's home. 34° Telemarketers would
recognize that the particular individual did not wish to receive solici-
tations, while social callers could simply ignore the tone."' ADADs
could be programmed to disconnect when the tone is played over the
phone line. Finally, phone companies could use a system in which
consumers who wished not to receive telemarketing, or specifically
ADAD calls, would be listed in the phone book with an asterisk next
to their names. 342 The expenses of implementing and maintaining this
system, however, would probably be passed along to subscribers by
telephone companies."'
V. CONCLUSION
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 is, in part,
unconstitutional. The Act distinguishes among types of speech based
solely on content. It singles out a small category of all telemarketing
telephone calls that represents no greater a threat to residential privacy
than any other type of call. No reasonable fit exists between the ban-
ning of only commercial ADAD calls and the residential privacy in-
terests Congress sought to protect by enacting the TCPA. Finally, the
Act unfairly impacts on small businesses that employ a cost-effective,
efficient form of technology. Congress should consider reworking sev-
eral provisions of the TCPA, especially in light of the Moser decision.
It may want to use do-not-call or do-call databases for ADADs, mandate
procedural requirements or utilize emerging technologies that allow
frustrated consumers to maintain their privacy without infringing on
solicitors' right to free speech. In the meantime, consumers who do
get calls or faxes forbidden by the Act should file suit and collect $5001
HOWARD E. BERKENBLIT
337 See Arcadi, supra note 251, at 431; Nightline, supra note 15l (statement of Ray Kolker).
338 Arcadi, supra note 251, at 431; Nightline, supra note 151 (statement of Ray Kolker).
3" Nightline, supra note 151 (statement of Ray Kolker).
340 See Nadel, supra note 17, at 123-24.
341 Id. at 123.
342 See Luten, supra note 18, at 157-58.
343 See id. at 158.
